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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC.
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14397

vs.
GLEN BARNES, An Individual,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a suit by a heating and electrical goods supplier,
A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC. against GLEN BARNES to recover
payment upon a personal guarantee executed by the said GLEN
BARNES for goods supplied to BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After conducting discovery, including depositions of A.
RAY CURTIS, President of A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC., and
HUGH BARNES, President of BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,
who was also a co-guarantor with GLEN BARNES on a Personal
Guarantee executed by both HUGH BARNES AND GLEN BARNES, GLEN

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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BARNES moved for Summary Judgment against A. RAY CURTIS
COMPANY, INC. based upon its affirmative defense of accord
and satisfaction and, therefore, release. A. RAY CURTIS
COMPANY, INC. then filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon a failure of consideration to
accord and satisfaction or a release.

support either an

The Court below

denied the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion and granted the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC. seeks reversal of the order
denying its Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment and a reversal
of the order granting GLEN BARNES' Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY is a Utah Corporation
in good standing (R 56, 73) which company has been and is
engaged in supplying heating and air conditioning materials
and accessories.

(R 72)

Between the dates of November 11, 1969 and June 1, 1970
the defendant, GLEN BARNES, together with his father, HUGH
BARNES, were officers in the business of BARNES HEATING &
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah Corporation.

(R 9, 11, 37; Hugh

Barnes Deposition p. 7, lines 18 to 20.)
Prior to November 11, 1969 plaintiff requested the
personal guarantees of HUGH BARNES and defendant GLEN BARNES
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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as additional security that the account of BARNES HEATING &
ELECTRIC COMPANY with plaintiff would be paid.

(R 56, 57,

37; Hugh Barnes Deposition p. 13,)
The Personal Guarantee Agreement was signed by HUGH R.
BARNES and GLEN BARNES who incidentally designated themselves
on the said guarantee as "President" and "Vice-President,"
respectively.

(R 11)

It was at all times understood between

the parties that each of these gentlemen signed in their
individual capacities and would be personally liable for the
debt incurred by BARNES HEATING & ELECTRIC COMPANY within
the scope of the Personal Guarantee Agreement.

(R 73; Hugh

Barnes Deposition p. 13, lines 6 to 10; A. Ray Curtis Deposition
p. 5, lines 3 to 18.)
In reliance upon the validity of this Personal Guarantee
Agreement, plaintiff supplied BARNES HEATING & ELECTRIC
COMPANY with heating and air conditioning materials and
supplies between November 11, 1969 and June 1, 1970.
8)

(R 1,

A copy of the Guarantee Agreement in question is shown

in the Record at page 11.
With the exception of some work that BARNES HEATING &
ELECTRIC COMPANY performed for plaintiff, BARNES HEATING &
ELECTRIC COMPANY did not pay plaintiff for the materials
supplied between November 11, 1969 and June 1, 1970.

After

all deductions, claims and offsets were rendered, the amount
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of $8,488.06 remained owing on the balance for the materials
supplied.

(R 1, 8)

No party disputes that the total

amount of $8,488.06 was due and owing plaintiff.

(R 8,

Deposition of Hugh Barnes pp. 18 & 19, "Stipulation of
Counsel"; see also, pp. 22 & 23.)
Plaintiff subsequently accepted a personal check from
HUGH BARNES for the amount of $3,000.00.

(R 1, 8)

The

check was executed with the following restrictive endorsement:
Endorsement of this check constitutes payment in
full of interest and principal to A. RAY CURTIS
COMPANY from BARNES HEATING & ELECTRIC COMPANY.
Plaintiff cashed the check and reduced the balance of the
obligation to $5,488.06.

(R 11 & 12.)

Both prior to the time at which the check was received
and subsequent thereto, plaintiff continually expressed its
intent to both GLEN BARNES and HUGH BARNES that the $3,000.00
check satisfied only HUGH BARNES1 portion of the obligation
to plaintiff under the Personal Guarantee Agreement and
plaintiff would request GLEN BARNES to satisfy the balance
of $5,488.06.

At no time was plaintiff informed or made

aware of any agreement between HUGH BARNES, BARNES HEATING &
ELECTRIC COMPANY, and defendant as to the respective amounts
for which each would be responsible in discharging the
indebtedness to the plaintiff.

(Depositions of A. RAY

CURTIS pp. 18 to 23, 25, 27; Deposition of HUGH BARNES pp.
26, 29 to
31,
Digitized
by the33,
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Plaintiff requested the remaining balance from defendant,
and defendant refused to pay said amount.

(R 1/ 8 ) . As a

result, this action was brought for $5,48 8.06, plus interest,
attorney1s fees and costs against defendant.

(R 1)

Defendant answered plaintiff's Complaint alleging
accord and satisfaction, but admitted that the total amount
of the debt due plaintiff was $8,488.06.

(R 8, 9)

Defendant

further alleged that he was not personally liable on the
Guarantee Agreement, but had signed only in a representative
capacity.

(R 9)

Defendant subsequently brought a Motion

for Summary Judgment based upon the defense of accord and
satisfaction and failure to reserve rights in writing.

(R

34, 39, 40)
Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (R
41) and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof and in opposition
to defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, (R 43) alleging
the absence of a meeting of the minds between the parties
and the absence of consideration to support an accord and
satisfaction.

(R 46, 48, 50)

The trial court found that defendant was personally
liable upon the Guarantee Agreement (R 73) but granted
Summary Judgment in favor of defendant based upon accord and
satisfaction.

(R 73, 74)

Plaintiff has brought this appeal

to the Utah Supreme Court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING GLEN BARNES1 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND INCORRECTLY DENIED A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY,
INC.'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
POINT I
AN ENFORCEABLE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION MUST BE SUPPORTED BY
CONSIDERATION, AND PARTIAL PAYMENT OF AN UNDISPUTED DEBT
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONSIDERATION.
In order to establish a valid accord and satisfaction,
the required elements of a contract must exist.

American

Jurisprudence 2d, "Accord and Satisfaction" §4, at 217 sets
forth the following rule:
"The discharge of claims by way of accord and satisfaction
is dependent upon a contract, express or implied; and
it follows that the essentials necessary to valid
contracts generally must be present in a contract of
accord and satisfaction. Therefore, the following
elements are essential: (1) A proper subject matter,
(2) Competent parties, (3) An assent or meeting of the
minds of the parties, and (4) A consideration."
The above reference from American Jurisprudence 2d
cites the Utah case of Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity
Building and Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669,
(1938), (hereinafter, Badger) which quotes the cited language
at 676.

The Utah Supreme Court also made the following

observation:
"Nor does the fact that plaintiff signed a receipt in
full evidence or infer that a dispute existed. Nor
would such a receipt be controlling as showing an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

accord and satisfaction had been effected. In the
absence of a dispute or other consideration, the part
payment received would only discharge the debt pro
tanto, ... Having pleaded an accord and satisfaction
the burden was upon defendant to prove such defense."
Id., at 677.
Defendant here relies upon the endorsement of a personal
check containing a recitation of an attempted accord and
satisfaction.

No evidence was offered by defendant to prove

a dispute as to the amount due, nor has evidence been offered
to show any legal consideration.

It was the defendant's

duty to show such consideration.

Consequently, in the light

of Badger, supra, it was reversible error for the lower
court to rely solely upon an endorsement on a personal check
as the basis for a finding of a valid and enforceable accord
and satisfaction which would support the granting of defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and the dismissal with prejudice
of plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant

admits in his Answer to plaintiff's Complaint that the
amount of the debt is not and was never in dispute.

Under

Badger that leaves only the possibility of an independent
"consideration" to support any valid accord and satisfaction.
There was no such consideration in the present case.
Badger, supra, also cites the Utah Supreme Court decision
set forth in Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society
of U.S., 94 Utah 532 72 P.2d 1060, (1937) (hereinafter,
Browning) which at page 1068 states:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"...there must be consideration for the agreement.
Settlement of an unliquidated or a disputed claim where
the parties are apart in good faith presents such
consideration. Where the claim is definite and there
is no dispute but admittance of its owing, the agreement
to take a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction
is not good unless attended by some consideration....
If a doctor sends me a bill for $20.00 when it should
have been $30.00 and I pay it, it is not an accord and
satisfaction. It is merely payment of less than I
owe."
In F.M.A. Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc., 17
Utah 2d 80, 402 P.2d 670, at 672 and 673 (1965), the Court
states the general rule, uniformly followed by Utah Courts
in cases of accord and satisfaction, that where a claim is
for a definite and undisputed amount, i.e., for a liquidated
amount, which is also past due, an agreement by a creditor
to take a lesser amount, even when paid, does not discharge
the whole debt.

Since the creditor receives only that which

he is already entitled to receive, there is no consideration
for the agreement.
See also Bennett vs. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) wherein defendant raised
the issue of accord and satisfaction with regard to a check
which stated "Payment in full of the account stated below endorsement of check by Payee is sufficient receipt".

The

Utah Supreme Court in that case found that there was no
accord and satisfaction which entitled the plaintiff to
maintain his claim against the defendant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The case of Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Hart, 25
Utah 2d 244, 480 P.2d 131 (1971) adopts the following cogent
language of Corbin on Contracts, Section 1292, at 177 through
178.
"There is no doubt that if no part of the claim is
in dispute and the creditor sends by mistake a
bill showing less than the amount actually due,
the payment of the amount does not operate as a
full satisfaction, even though the debtor sent his
check endorsed 'to balance account to date 1 .
Under such circumstances a promise by the creditor
to accept the check as full satisfaction would be
without any sufficient consideration." Id., at
133.
See also, Reliable Furniture Company vs. American Home
Assurance Company, 24 Utah 2d 93, 446 P. 2d 368 (1970) and
Hintze vs. Search, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P. 2d 202 (1968).
There has been, at all times, complete agreement between
plaintiff, defendant and HUGH BARNES as to the extent of the
debt owed by BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY.
therefore, a liquidated, undisputed claim.

There is,

Prior to the

time that HUGH BARNES tendered payment of $3,000 on a debt
of $8,488.06 there was no dispute as to the amount owed.

In

the words of the Utah Supreme Court in Browning, "...[where]
the claim is definite and [there is] no dispute but an
admittance of its owing, the agreement to take a lesser
amount even followed by satisfaction is not good unless
attended by some consideration."

Browning, at 1068.

The

payment of the $3,000 cannot constitute consideration since
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the plaintiff received only what he was otherwise entitled
to by the terms of plaintiff's agreement with HUGH BARNES
and defendant as guarantors of the obligation of BARNES
HEATING & ELECTRIC COMPANY.

"Under no conceivable theory

can the doing of an act which a party is already obligated
to do, constitute the consideration for a new promise on the
part of the other party."

Van Tassell v. Lewis, 118 Utah

356, 222 P.2d 350 (1950) at 355.

An accord and satisfaction

to settle for a lesser amount would be just such a new
promise.

In the document entitled "Summary Judgment",

prepared by defendant's counsel, there is no recital of a
finding of fact or "statement of facts" which show a meeting
of the minds and/or new consideration to support a valid
accord and satisfaction or a release.

In the absence of

additional consideration of some sort any alleged accord and
satisfaction is unenforceable against the plaintiff.
In the present case, the defendant has admitted the
amount due and the trial court found upon the facts that
defendant was personally liable upon the guarantee.

Therefore,

under the cited case law, defendant is still liable to
plaintiff in the amount of the unpaid balance since HUGH
BARNES' payment of $3,000 only reduced the debt pro tanto.
Accordingly, the court below erred in granting defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in denying plaintiff's
Cross-Motion
for
Summary
Digitized by the
Howard
W. Hunter Law Judgment.
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
WITHOUT A MEETING OF THE MINDS THERE CAN BE NO ENFORCEABLE
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
American Jurisprudence 2d states that in addition to
consideration, a valid accord and satisfaction requires a
meeting of the minds between the parties to the transaction.
American Jurisprudence 2d, "Accord and Satisfaction," § 4.
There was no such meeting of the minds in the instant case.
Both parties in their depositions differ as to just
which parties the $3,000 payment would affect.

A. RAY

CURTIS, President of the plaintiff Corporation , negotiated
directly with HUGH BARNES.

In MR. CURTIS1 deposition at

pages 18 to 19, he states that at no time did he intend nor
was it the intention of the parties that either BARNES
HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY or defendant be relieved of the
duty to pay the balance of the debt outstanding after receipt
of the three thousand dollar ($3,000) partial payment.
HUGH BARNES has testified that the only statements made
to him by plaintiff's President were "All right," ..." if
you will dig that much money up, I will let you off the
hook," and "You are out."

Deposition of HUGH BARNES, at 25

and 26, lines 22, 23 and 11.
directly to HUGH BARNES.

These statements were made

HUGH BARNES further stated that he

never talked to plaintiff1s President about any intention on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his part that the defendant, GLEN BARNES, be relieved of his
duty to pay.

See Deposition of HUGH BARNES, at 29, lines 14

to 16.
Based upon the testimony of the only two parties who
dealt directly with each other, the minds of the two parties
apparently did not meet but passed by each other as two
"ships in the night11 never reaching a common understanding
of what the one meant by the word "you" and what the other
understood.

Plaintiff's President used the word meaning a

singular "you" and HUGH BARNES apparently understood the
word as plural.
Plaintiff's treatment of the $3,000 check was in no way
inconsistent with his understanding.

The restriction was

written on a personal check of HUGH BARNES.

It appears to

be the kind of check which he would use to pay a personal
obligation for which he was liable.

His restriction states

that it is payment to plaintiff from BARNES HEATING AND
ELECTRIC COMPANY.

In light of the fact that HUGH BARNES

gave the plaintiff his personal check, and giving due consideration
to what was said by the parties and what was understood by
plaintiff at the time of the negotiations with respect to
the check, it is not unreasonable for plaintiff to have
understood the restriction in this manner:

"Payment in full

of interest and principal to A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY relieving
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-12- OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

HUGH BARNES personally from further payment on the account
of BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Any other interpretation

indicates that there was clearly a failure of the parties1
minds to meet with respect to just who would be released by
this payment.
In view of the foregoing facts and cited law it is
clear that there was no meeting of the minds.

Where that

element of an accord and satisfaction is absent, any such
alleged accord and satisfaction is unenforceable.

Where

there is no enforceable accord and satisfaction, and the
debt has been admitted and adjudged to be a personal one,
there can be no room for reasonable men to differ, and
plaintiff is therefore entitled to Summary Judgment.

Accord-

ingly, it was reversible error for the court below to grant
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to deny plaintiff's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
POINT III
IN THE ABSENCE OF A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND A VALID AND SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION ANY ALLEGED RELEASE
IS UNENFORCEABLE.
As with an accord and satisfaction, a release is also a
new contract between the parties.

A valid and enforceable

release must, therefore, be supported by adequate consideration.

Also, a meeting of the minds must occur between the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-13. contain errors.
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parties before a release is effective.
sets forth the following rule:

American Jurisprudence

"Ordinarily to be effective,

a release must be based on a consideration of some sort," 66
Am,Jur. 2d, "Release", § 8 at 683.

In the same section of

the cited treatise it states that if a release is to be
valid, consideration must be present and the consideration
must be valuable.

Id.. , at 685.

Under universally recognized

principles, the performance of a legal duty is not sufficient
consideration to support a release.

Therefore, the partial

payment of a liquidated, undisputed, and material obligation
does not furnish sufficient consideration for a release of
the balance of the underlying obligation.
In Roberts1 Investment Company vs. Gibbons and Reed Concrete
Products Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d, 116, (1969) the
contention was made by Roberts that because it had made
partial payment and received a release of all claims from
Gibbons and Reed, it was relieved from any liability arising
under a mechanic's lien statute.

The Utah Supreme Court,

after finding that payment "earlier" rather than "later" was
not sufficient consideration for the release, stated that
the amount owed was a liquidated sum and that there was no
dispute that the amount was then due and owing; therefore,
there was no consideration for the release of the claim and
the release was not binding upon Gibbons and Reed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

Supreme Court held in favor of Gibbons and Reed and ordered
Roberts1 Investment Company to pay the balance of the claim
to Gibbons and Reed.

38 Am,Jur, 2d, "Guaranty", § 80 pro-

vides the following rule with respect to an agreement discharging a guarantor and the necessity of adequate consideration:
"The agreement of a creditor to release the principal
debtor's guarantor from liability under the guarantee
contract is binding upon the creditor if the
agreement possesses the elements of a contract.
Thus, where there is sufficient consideration for
the creditor's promise to release the guarantor
from liability under the contract, the promise is
binding and is a good defense to an action by the
creditor on the guaranty. However, where there is
no consideration to support the creditor's promise
to release the guarantor from his contractual
liability under the guaranty, the promise is not
binding and is not a defense to an action by the
creditor on the guaranty. Thus, the fact that a
release of a guarantor has been reduced to writing
and signed by the creditor is not sufficient—in
and of itself and absent a consideration—to make
the release enforceable against the creditor;
however, this rule has been changed in some jurisdictions by virtue of special statutes."
Utah has no such special statute.

For the same reasons set

forth in Point I, supra, relating to the absence of sufficient
consideration to support a valid accord and satisfaction,
there was no consideration whatsoever to support any alleged
release.

As stated, the partial or full performance of a

duty which one is legally obligated to do is not sufficient
consideration to support an agreement of a contractual .
nature, be it an accord and satisfaction or a release.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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For like reasons there was no meeting of the minds with
reference to the alleged release.
II, supra.

See discussion in Point

Consequently, any purported release as it relates

to the defendant, GLEN BARNES, is unenforceable.

Accordingly,

the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been
granted.
POINT IV
THE UTAH JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT, U.C.A. 15-4-4 AND 15-4-5
(1953) IS INAPPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS NO ENFORCEABLE RELEASE.
Because any supposed release which may have been given
is not enforceable in this case for the reasons stated in
Point III, the Utah Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann.,
Section 15-4-1 et.seq. (1953), has no application.

Since

the subject joint obligation was neither validly released
nor discharged, defendant remains legally liable under the
terms of the Guaranty Agreement for the amount of debt not
yet paid.

The purpose of the cited statute is to relieve a

co-obligor where, and to the extent, a creditor releases a
co-obligor to the detriment of a remaining co-obligor.
Plateau Uranium Investment Corp. v. Sugar and Ulmer, 8 Utah
2d 5, 326 P.2d 1022 (1958) at 1024.

Defendant suffers no

detriment by an invalid, unenforceable release of his coobligor.

Only a valid, enforceable release activates the

provisions of the Utah Joint Obligations Act to release a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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co-obligor of any liability on a debt.

There was no valid

release in the present case.
POINT V
DEFENDANT IS NOT RELIEVED OF LIABILITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
(1953) SECTIONS 15-4-4 AND

15-4-5, EVEN IF APPLICABLE.

Utah Code Ann. (1953) Section 15-4-4 states:
"Subject to the provisions of Section 15-4-3, the
obligee's release or discharge of one or more of
several obligors, or of one or more of joint or of
joint and several obligors, shall not discharge
co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing
and as part of the same transaction as the release
or discharge expressly reserves his rights; and in
the absence of such a reservation of rights shall
discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided
in Section 15-4-5.
(Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. (1953) Section 15-4-3 provides that the
Defendant is entitled to a credit for the $3,000.00 paid to
plaintiff by HUGH BARNES.

However, the cited provision does

not totally release GLEN BARNES, a joint obligor, where
there is no written reservation against him.

It merely

refers to Section 15-4-5 to determine the extent of the
discharge.
Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 15-4-5 provides for different
results depending upon the knowledge which plaintiff had of
the contractual relationship between HUGH BARNES and defendant
at the time of any alleged release of HUGH BARNES.

Because

the plaintiff, A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, had no knowledge of
any agreement between HUGH BARNES and defendant, the second
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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paragraph of Section 15-4-5 applies.

If one indulges in the

likely assumption that the defendant GLEN BARNES and HUGH
BARNES may have agreed to be liable for fifty percent (50%)
of the amount owed the plaintiff, then the addition of
parenthetical statements illustrative of the present case
clarifies Section 15-4-5.

It states:

"If an obligee so releasing or discharging an
obligor has not then such knowledge or reason to
know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of
two amounts, namely; (a) the amount of the fractional
share of the obligor released or discharged,
[$8,488.06 less $3,000 = $5,488.06], or (b) the
amount that such obligor was bound by his contract
or relation with the co-obligor to pay [$8,488.06
less $4,244.03 = $4,244.03].
(Parenthetical
phrases and Emphasis added.)
Under the Personal Guarantee Agreement, both HUGH
BARNES and defendant, GLEN BARNES, are jointly and severally
obligated to pay one hundred percent (100%) of the debt to
the plaintiff.

Each had a legal right of equal contribution

as against the other.

There was apparently no definite

agreement between HUGH BARNES and defendant as to the respective fractional share of the liability to plaintiff each
would bear.

Further, plaintiff, A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, was

never made aware of the existence or terms of any such
agreement.

The second paragraph of Section 15-4-5 provides

that the release of HUGH BARNES has the effect of reducing
the obligation of the defendant, GLEN BARNES, to the plaintiff
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by the lesser of (a) the amount which HUGH BARNES actually
paid, or (b) one-half, assuming HUGH BARNES and GLEN BARNES
agreed among themselves to be equally liable on the obligation owed to the plaintiff; whichever amount is less.

Under

alternative (a), as illustrated in the cited material,
supra , defendant's obligation would be reduced by $3,000.
Section 15-4-5 states that the indebtedness would be reduced
by "...the lesser..." of alternative (a) or alternative (b),
defendant is liable to the plaintiff in the amount of $5,488.06.
($8,488.06 less $3,000 = $5,488.06).
American Jurisprudence 2d sustains plaintiff's position.
"Where the Uniform Joint Obligations Act has been
adopted, a release which does not contain an express reservation of rights against a co-obligor
will discharge the co-obligor to the extent of
either the amount of the fractional shares of the
released obligor, or the amount that such obligor
was bound by his contract or relation with the
obligor to pay". 66 Am.Jur. 2d, "Release," § 36
at 715. (Emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the cited authorities and foregoing analysis
it is clear
(1)

That the Utah Joint Obligations Act, if applicable,
operates to discharge the indebtedness of the
defendant to the plaintiff only to the extent of
the payment received from HUGH BARNES, namely
$3,000.00, leaving a balance due the plaintiff of
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(2)

That any alleged release and/or accord and satisfaction must be supported by the elements of a
valid contract, namely sufficient consideration
and a meeting of the minds;

(3)

That there was no such meeting of the minds and/or
valid and sufficient consideration to support a
release and/or accord and satisfaction in this
case;

(4)

That the "Summary Judgment", prepared by defendant's
counsel, and entered by the Court below, contained
no finding of a meeting of the minds between the
parties and/or consideration sufficient to support
any alleged release or accord and satisfaction;

(5)

That the Record herein clearly shows thcit there
was no meeting of the minds and/or consideration
to support any alleged release or accord and satisfaction;

(6)

That the Court below consequently erred, as a
matter of law, in finding a valid accord and
satisfaction in the present case.

Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment of the
Third District Court should be reversed and remanded with
instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in the
amount of $5,488.06 plus interest, costs, and attorney's
fees.
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